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R´ esum´ e
Nous d´ emontrons qu’une´ economie d’´ echange (d´ eﬁnie par ses pr´ ef´ e-
rences et ses dotations) qui g´ en` ere une fonction de demande exc´ eden-
taire aggr´ eg´ ee (DEA) z e s tp r o c h ed el ’ ´ economie associ´ ee ` al aD E Az ,
perturbation arbitraire de z.
Abstract
We establish that an exchange economy, i.e., preferences and en-
dowments, that generates a given aggregate excess demand (AED)
function is close to the economy generating the AED obtained by an
arbitrary perturbation of the original one.
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1 Introduction
Genericity results — such as establishing that the set of equilibrium prices
constitutes a manifold of a certain dimension or that the number of regular
equilibria is ﬁnite and stable — are obtained by perturbation techniques,
where the underlying primitives (e.g., preferences and endowments) are sub-
jected to inﬁnitesimal changes.
Debreu’s (1970) proof of local isolation of regular economies, for exam-
ple, requires a perturbation of endowments. Extending the proof to critical
economies requires additional eﬀort: since the perturbation must also af-
fect the curvature of the equilibrium manifold, a linear perturbation such as
the one at the heart of Debreu’s proof no longer suﬃces. An example of a
higher-order perturbation is found in Mas-Colell (1985, Proposition 8.8.3),
who shows that for a one-dimensional parameterization of economies, a “ﬂat”
AED is not generic in the ﬁrst consumer’s utility. It is instructive to note
that Mas-Colell must resort not only to a perturbation of endowments, but
also to a quadratic perturbation of (indirect) utility.
Allen (1984), on the other hand, establishes much more, namely, ﬁnite-
ness for multi-dimensional parameterizations of economies by employing a
theorem by Tougeron (1972), according to which local ﬁniteness of the num-
ber of pre-images is a generic property of smooth functions. The result comes
at a cost, however, in that Allen works directly with AED functions rather
than with the agents’ underlying preferences and endowments. In this note,
we show that Allen’s approach is fully justiﬁed.
Speciﬁcally, we establish that the economy, i.e., preferences and endow-
ments, that generates a given AED function is close to the economy gener-
ating the AED obtained by an arbitrary perturbation the initial one.1
We show that the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu results (roughly, if it
“looks” like an AED, it is an AED for some economy) are stable in the
1Lehmann-Waﬀenschmidt (1995) obtains a result in the same spirit for the family of









































8following sense: the economy underlying a perturbed AED function is nec-
essarily close to the economy behind the original AED function. Moreover,
the two economies diﬀer (slightly) in the preferences and endowments of the
ﬁrst consumer only.
Part of the challenge, of course, is to show that perturbations of AED
functions correspond to “legal” perturbations of preferences, i.e, perturbed
utility functions must continue to satisfy the canonical properties of utility
functions.
This opens wider the door to further genericity and determinacy research
based on transversality arguments since one may now perturb the AED func-
tion directly thus sparing one the more tedious exercise of perturbing eco-
nomic primitives.
In a companion paper, Castro and Dakhlia (2008) make full use of this
result to establish Thom-Boardman stratiﬁcation of AED, which requires
high-order perturbations that would have been more diﬃcult to obtain by
conventional means. The stratiﬁcation result, in turn, provides an alternative
proof of ﬁniteness of all equilibria, including critical ones.
2N o t a t i o n
Consider an economy with L commodities (  =1 ,...,L)a n dI traders (i =
1,...,I). Let Ω be the non-negative orthant of RL and let each trader i be
deﬁned by her endowment ωi ∈ RL and her preferences  i, a partial order
on Ω with the following properties:
1. rationality (completeness, reﬂexivity, and transitivity)
2. continuity ({x : y  i x} and {y : y  i x} are open);
3. non-satiation (x ≥ y (x  ≥ y , ∀  =1 ,...,L)a n dx  = y ⇒ x  i y);
4. strict convexity (x ∼i y and x  = y ⇒∀ α ∈ (0,1), αx+( 1−α)y  i x).
Let Ξ denote the space of all such preferences. Following Kannai (1970),
every  i∈ Ξ may be represented by a continuous utility function ui :Ω→ R
deﬁned as follows: for any x ∈ Ω, there exists a unique ˆ x in the principal
diagonal of Ω such that x ∼i ˆ x (i.e., agent i is indiﬀerent between x and ˆ x).
Then, let ui(x) ≡  ˆ x ,w h e r e .  is the Euclidean norm. Denote C∗ the class









































8Let u1,u 2 ∈ C∗ represent the preferences  1, 2∈ Ξ of agents 1 and 2.
The metric
ρ( 1, 2)=m a x x∈Ω
|u1(x) − u2(x)|
1+ x 2
induces a minimal topology on Ξ with A ≡{ (x,y, ):x   y} open in
Ω × Ω × Ξ. Intuitively speaking, preference order  1 is close to preference
order  2 if ρ( 1, 2) is small. Similarly, u1 is close to u2 if the Euclidean
distance |u1(x)−u2(x)| is bounded by a small number for all x in any compact
set.2 Finally, we deﬁne a perturbation of preferences as preferences that are
distinct but arbitrarily close to the original ones. Similarly, a perturbation of
a utility function is deﬁned as a distinct, but arbitrarily close, utility function.
3R e s u l t
Any preference ordering can be represented by exactly one utility function
in C∗. Thus, perturbations of a C∗-utility necessarily imply perturbations of
the underlying preferences and vice-versa. Moreover, direct perturbations of
AED correspond to perturbations of preferences and endowments.
The following lemmas show that a perturbation of preferences corresponds
to a perturbation of utility, and vice-versa.
Lemma 3.1. Consider preferences  0∈ Ξ represented by a utility function
u0 ∈ C∗.L e t u ∈ C∗, representing preferences  , be a perturbation of u0.
Then  ∈ Ξ is a perturbation of  0.3
Proof. Because u is close to u0, we know that for any compact subset K ⊂ Ω,
∃ε>0: |u(x) − u0(x)| <ε , ∀ x ∈ K.
We have
|u(x) − u0(x)|
1+ x 2 ≤| u(x) − u0(x)| <ε , ∀ x ∈ K.
For u ∈ C∗ there exists a constant C, depending only on L =d i m Ω ,s u c h
that 0 ≤ u(x) <C  x . (See Kannai and, in particular, his proof of Theorem
2This is just the uniform norm on compact sets, i.e., the compact-open topology.










































∀ x ∈ Ω,
|u(x) − u0(x)|
1+ x 2 ≤
|u(x)| + |u0(x)|
1+ x 2 ≤
2C x 
1+ x 2,
which converges to zero as  x  approaches inﬁnity, that is,
∀ ε>0, ∃R>0:  x  >R⇒
2C x 
1+ x 2 <ε .
Take K to be the compact set Cl(BR(0)), the closure of the ball of radius R
about the origin.
Therefore by deﬁnition,
ρ( , 0)=m a x x∈K
|u(x) − u0(x)|
1+ x 2 <ε .
Lemma 3.2. Consider preferences  0∈ Ξ represented by a utility function
u0 ∈ C∗.L e t ∈ Ξ, represented by a utility u ∈ C∗, be a perturbation of  0.
Then u is a perturbation of u0.
Proof. We need to establish that for any compact subset K ⊂ Ω,
∀ ε>0, ∃δ>0: ρ( , 0) <δ ⇒ maxx∈K|u(x) − u0(x)| <ε .
From Kannai’s equation 3.2 (p. 799), we have
{ : ρ( , 0) <δ } =

 :m a x x≤R
|u(x) − u0(x)|
1+ x 2 <δ

.
Since K is compact, we can choose R such that K ⊂ BR(0) so that  x 2 ≤ R2.
Then
|u(x) − u0(x)| <δ (1 +  x 
2) ≤ δ(1 + R
2).
In order to have |u(x) − u0(x)| <ε , it suﬃces to choose δ such that δ<
ε/(1 + R2).
In light of these two lemmas, we can henceforth interchangeably work










































8We now turn to the excess demand of an agent endowed with ωi ∈ RL.
Trader i solves Utility Maximization Problem (UMP)
maxxi∈Ω ui(x
i) such that p · x
i ≤ p · ω
i. (1)
Strict convexity of preferences ensures that the solution, xi(p,p·ωi), is unique
and a continuous function of both price vector p and endowment ωi.N o n -
satiation guarantees that the budget constraint is binding and can thus be
written as
p · x
i = p · ω
i ⇔ p · (x
i − ω
i)=0 . (2)
Geometrically, the constraint is the hyperplane through ωi orthogonal to p,
while the solution to the UMP corresponds to the point of tangency between
the level curves of ui and the hyperplane. For smooth level curves, the point
of tangency is located where ∇ui, the gradient of ui, is parallel to p.T h e






and the AED for the economy is given by z(p)=
n
i=1 zi(p).
The main result of this section, Theorem 3.2, establishes that a pertur-
bation of AED is equivalent to a perturbation of economic primitives, that
is, preferences and endowments. Note that, from the deﬁnition of AED, it
suﬃces to consider the perturbation of the excess demand of a single con-
sumer. We will thus drop the agent-speciﬁc superscript, when no confusion
is possible.
We proceed by ﬁrst establishing Theorem 3.1, which states that the per-
turbation of an agent’s utility and endowment is equivalent to a perturbation
of her excess demand. This will require a sequence of lemmas. Our main
result (Theorem 3.2) then follows as a consequence of considering utilities in
C∗.
Theorem 3.1. Consider a consumer with endowment ω ∈ Ω and preferences
satisfying (1)–(4) that are represented by a C2 (twice diﬀerentiable) utility
function (not necessarily in C∗). Let demand x0(p) be the unique solution to
the UMP (1). Then,
(I) A solution to the UMP deﬁned by a perturbation (¯ u, ¯ ω) of (u,ω) is a









































8(II) Conversely, a perturbation ¯ x(p) of x0(p) is the unique solution of the
UMP deﬁned by a perturbation (¯ u, ¯ ω) of (u,ω).
Proof. The proof of part (I) is a consequence of the continuous dependence
of demand on price, endowments and utility as proved in Lemma 3.3. Since
strict convexity of preferences guarantees that x0(p) ≡ x0(p,p·ω)i sac o n t i n -
uous function of ω, any perturbation of ω will correspond to a perturbation
of x0(p). Lemma 3.3 shows that the same applies to perturbations of utility.
To prove part (II), we show that a perturbation of the solution must
originate in a perturbation of utility and/or endowments. It is here that
we need the assumption of a twice-diﬀerentiable utility function. At the
solution x0(p), the budget constraint (2) is tangent to the indiﬀerence curve
containing x0, which means that the gradient of u at x0, ∇u(x0), is orthogonal
to p · (x − ω)=0 .A ss u c h ,∇u(x0) is parallel to p.
Let ¯ x(p) be a perturbation of x0(p), say  ¯ x − x0  <δfor small δ>
0. If ¯ x does not satisfy the budget constraint, we perturb ω to ¯ ω so that
p · (¯ x − ¯ ω) = 0. In addition, we shall choose ¯ ω so that the hyperplane
described by p · (x − ¯ ω) = 0 is parallel to the original one. Denote the




0, ¯ x) ≤ d(x
 
0,x 0)+d(x0, ¯ x),
where d(x0, ¯ x) <δand d(x 
0,x 0) can be made small by continuity of the
demand with ω.S i n c e d(¯ ω,ω) ≤ d(x0, ¯ x) <δ ,w eh a v ed(x 
0,x 0) <εfor a
convenient choice of δ. Hence, ¯ x is also a perturbation of x 
0 and we can
henceforth suppose that the demand for the unperturbed problem and ¯ x
belong to the same budget constraint, dropping the use of the prime.
It remains to show that we can perturb the utility so that ¯ x(p)i st h e
solution to the UMP.
Deﬁne Φ : Ω → Ωb y
Φ(x)=x − ϕ( x − x0 )(¯ x − x0),
where ϕ : R → R is constant and equal to 1 for 0 ≤ t ≤ δ1, ϕ(t)i s
constant and equal to zero for t ≥ 2δ1 and ϕ(t) is smooth and decreasing for
δ1 ≤ t ≤ 2δ1. (See Figure 1.)





















































Figure 1: Graph of a function satisfying the conditions imposed on ϕ.
for some constants A and B.W e c h o o s e δ1 so that δ<δ 1 in order to
guarantee that ϕ( ¯ x−x0 ) = 1. Clearly, Φ is the identity for  x−x0 ≥2δ1
and a translation for  x − x0 ≤δ1.
Deﬁne ¯ u(x)=u(Φ(x)). We have
¯ u(¯ x)=u(Φ(¯ x)) = u(¯ x − ϕ( ¯ x − x0 )(¯ x − x0))
= u(x0)
and ∇¯ u(¯ x)=∇u(x0) (see Lemma 3.4 below). The level hypersurface of ¯ u at
¯ x is thus tangent to p · (x − ω) = 0 and hence, ¯ x is a solution to the UMP
deﬁned by ¯ u.
Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6 below show that ¯ u is increasing in x and that its
indiﬀerence curves are convex, thus ensuring that the underlying preferences
satisfy (1)–(4), thereby completing the proof.
Lemma 3.3. Let x be the unique solution to the UMP deﬁned by a utility u
and endowment ω.T h e nx is a continuous function of p, ω and u.
Proof. It is clear that x is a continuous function of p and ω.T o p r o v e
continuity on u, we proceed by contradiction. Let un be a sequence of utility
functions such that as n → +∞,w eh a v eun → u.L e t xn = xn(p)b et h e
unique maximum of un on
H(p,ω)={x : p · (x − ω)=0 }.
Assume limn→+∞xn  = x. By compactness of H(p,ω), we may assume that
xn → x∗  = xn, passing to a subsequence if necessary.









































8Continuity of each utility in conjunction with the hypothesis that xn → x∗
implies that, for each ﬁxed m ∈ N,w eh a v eum(xn) → um(x∗), that is, for all
δ>0















Let d(u,un) <δ / 3, that is, for all y ∈ K ⊂ Ω, a compact set also containing
x and x∗,








<u M(y) <u (y)+
δ
3



































Since n ≥ M, in particular for n = M,w eh a v e
uM(x) >u M(xM),
which is a contradiction because xM is the unique maximum of uM. Hence









































8Lemma 3.4. Let u and ¯ u be as deﬁned in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Then
we have ∇u(x0)=∇¯ u(¯ x).
















 ( x − x0 )(¯ x − x0)
∂ x − x0 
∂xj
,
where δij =1i fi = j and δij =0o t h e r w i s e . A tx =¯ x, ϕ ( ¯ x − x0 )=0










Lemma 3.5. Let u and ¯ u be as deﬁned in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Then
¯ u is increasing in each of its arguments.
















 ( x − x0 )(¯ x − x0)
∂ x − x0 
∂xj
= δij − ϕ
 ( x − x0 )(¯ x − x0)
xj − x0j
 x − x0 
.
By choosing δ  
δ1
A so that A




 ( x − x0 )(¯ x − x0)
xj − x0j
























































Otherwise, x is in a compact (in the annular region bounded by the discs of
radius δ1 and 2δ1)a n d
∂u
∂xj is bounded away from zero (as u is increasing in
each of its arguments). Hence, by making the absolute value of
∂Φi
∂xj suﬃciently




Lemma 3.6. The indiﬀerence curves of ¯ u as deﬁned in the proof of Theorem
3.1 are convex.
Proof. From Thorpe [11], we know that the normal curvature of a level hyper-
surface of a function u in the direction of a vector v ( v  = 1) perpendicular




<v ,H u(x)v> ,
where Hu(x) is the Hessian of u at x and <v , H u(x)v>represents the
quadratic form deﬁned by Hu(x) (see exercise 2.1 in [11] and section 2 of
Gladiali and Grossi [5]).
Because the level curves of u are convex, we know that Hu(x) is positive
deﬁnite for all x. We show that the entries of H¯ u(x) are close to the entries
of Hu(Φ(x)). Hence, ¯ u can be chosen so that H¯ u(x) is also positive deﬁnite.




















































































 ( x − x0 )]
2.
.(¯ x − x0)j(¯ x − x0)k
∂ x − x0 
∂xk

























depends on terms of the form (¯ x−x0)j. Note also that for x such that either
0 ≤  x−x0 ≤δ1 or  x−x0 ≥2δ1, the derivatives of ϕ are zero (because ϕ
is constant) and therefore, the second derivatives of u and ¯ u coincide. Since
{x ∈ Ω: δ1 ≤  x − x0 ≤2δ1}
is compact, the derivatives of u are bounded. We may then use our choice of
δ<δ 1 to bound the remaining derivatives in the same way as in the proof of
Lemma 3.5, so that the products involving derivatives of ϕ, and hence of Φ
become small.
We can now state our main result.
Theorem 3.2. Let z0(p) be the AED for an economy with L goods and I
traders characterized by preferences  i
0 satisfying (1)–(4) and endowments
ωi
0, i =1 ,...,L.A nA E Dz(p) is a perturbation of z0(p) if and only if z(p)
is the AED for an economy with L goods and I consumers such that the new
preferences  1 of the ﬁrst consumer are perturbations of  1
0 and the new










































8Proof. Choose utilities in C∗ to represent the preferences. Using Lemma 3.8,
we can approximate these by C2 utilities. Moreover, because of Lemmas
3.1 and 3.2, perturbations in utility correspond to perturbations in prefer-
ences and vice-versa. The result then follows from Theorem 3.1 and in a
straightforward way from the deﬁnition of AED.
Note that the preferences represented by the C2 utilities obtained through
Theorem 3.1 can be described by utilities in C∗.
In the proof of Lemma 3.8, we need the following:
Lemma 3.7. Let f : Rn → R be continuous and such that x>y⇒ f(x) >
f(y),w h e r ex>ymeans, as usual, that
∃ i : xi >y i and xj ≥ yj, for i  = j.
Then f is strictly quasi-concave if and only if f is strictly concave on level
s e t s ,t h a ti s ,i fx1,x 2 are such that f(x1)=f(x2) we have
∀ λ ∈ [0,1] : f(λx1 +( 1− λ)x2) >λ f(x1)+( 1− λ)f(x2). (5)
Proof. The if part of the statement is trivial. To show the converse, suppose
that (5) holds. Note that λf(x1)+( 1− λ)f(x2)=f(x1)=f(x2). We want
to show that
∀ λ ∈ (0,1) ∀ x,y f(λx +( 1− λ)y)=f(yλ) > min {f(x),f(y)},
which holds trivially if f(x)=f(y). Let f(x)  = f(y) and assume f(x) <
f(y). Denote by Lz = {x : f(x)=f(z)} the level set of z. By monotonicity,
Lx ∩ Ly = ∅.
Take w ∈ Ly such that w>x ,t h a ti s ,f(w) >f(x). Consider the points
on the segment connecting x to w,
wt = tx +( 1− t)w, for t ∈ [0,1].
By monotonicity, Lwt lies between Lx and Lw and f(wt) >f (x). Since
yλ ∈ Lwt for some t,w eh a v ef(yt) >f(x), concluding the proof.
Lemma 3.8. Let u ∈ C∗ be a utility representing preferences that satisfy
(1)–(4). Endow C∗ with the uniform norm on compact sets. There exists ¯ u









































8Proof. We need to show that ¯ u is strictly quasi-concave and increasing in
each coordinate.
We use a convolution kernel or molliﬁer, θε :Ω → R,a si nH i r s c h[ 6 ] ,
chapter 2, or Ghomi [4]. The molliﬁer is a non-negative function which takes









Theorem 2.3 in Hirsch [6] asserts that ¯ u and u are ε-close on compact sets.
Since u is strictly quasi-concave, using Lemma 3.7, we have, for λ ∈ [0,1],
¯ u(λx1 +( 1− λ)x2)=

Ω








[λu((x1 − y)+( 1− λ)u(x2 − y)]θε(y)dy
= λ¯ u(x1)+( 1− λ)¯ u(x2).
Since monotonicity is preserved by integration, ¯ u is monotonous and, by
Lemma 3.7, it is strictly quasi-concave.4
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